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Solving the Kidney Shortage Crisis Through the Use
of Non-Heart-Beating Cadaveric Donors: Legal
Endorsement of Perfusion as a Standard Procedure
MARLA K. CLARK*
INTRODUCTION
An emergency caller reports that a thirty-two-year-old man is experiencing
severe chest pain. An ambulance crew responds to the call, but en route to the
hospital, the man's heart stops beating. Despite heroic resuscitation efforts,
medical personnel are unable to revive him. At the hospital, the emergency
room physician declares the man dead. The only tasks remaining are to notify
the man's next of kin and deliver his body to the morgue. At most hospitals
in the United States today, this would be the end of the story, despite the fact
that technology exists to create something positive from this tragic event.
Because most hospitals do not consider cardiac death patients such as the
man just described to be potential organ donors, thousands of people each
year are denied the opportunity to become organ donors upon their death.'
The use of the medical technique of perfusion,2 however, would permit
physicians to successfully transplant kidneys from donors who have suffered
cardiac death.' Part I of this Note examines the status of organ transplan-
tation efforts in the United States and the current organ shortage crisis. Part
II outlines the medical procedure of kidney perfusion, which would allow a
greater number of people to become organ donors and thereby substantially
increase the supply of transplantable kidneys. Part III examines the contradic-
tory and confusing legal framework which currently impedes widespread
implementation of this procedure in the United States. Finally, Part IV
proposes a model law to facilitate the use of this procedure and markedly
increase the supply of available transplantable kidneys in the United States.
I. CURRENT ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION EFFORTS
AND THE ORGAN SHORTAGE CRISIS
Since the mid-1970's there have been two legal standards under which
medical personnel may declare a patient dead.4 The Uniform Determination
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.b.a., 1992, University
of Houston.'
1. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA") creates a right to donate one's organs upon death.
UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. 33 (1987); see infra note 19.
2. In the medical context, perfusion is the insertion of a tube into a cadaver, through which a
solution is flushed to cool the organs temporarily without removing them. See discussion infra part II.
3. See A.M. Castelao et al., Long-Term Renal Function of Kidneys Transplantedfrom Non-Heart-
Beating Cadaver Donors, 23 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2484 (1991).
4. See 4 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW § 21.01 (Michael G. Macdonald et al. eds., 1992);
Derek J. Jones, Retrospective on the Future: Brain Death and Evolving Legal Regimes for Tissue
Replacement Technology, 38 McGILL L.J. 394 (1993).
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of Death Act, which has been adopted in some form by at least thirty states,5
provides that "[a]n individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessa-
tion of circulatory and respiratory functions or (2) irreversible cessation of all
functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead."6 Prior to the
adoption of this definition, death was defined only by the cessation of circula-
tory and respiratory functions, with no reference to neurological functioning.7
Currently, in the United States, patients whose death has been determined
by neurological criteria are the sole source of donated organs. Persons
determined to lack brain function are commonly referred to as "brain dead."'
Brain-dead patients who become donors are called "heart-beating cadaver
donors" ("HBCD's") because their hearts continue to beat after death.
HBCD's are considered good sources for organ procurement because normal
heart and lung function can be maintained,9 thereby preventing damage to the
organs during the time period necessary to coordinate the organ transplant.
Tasks to be performed during this period include obtaining consent from the
next of kin, selecting a donee,"0 and assembling a transplant team.
In spite of the public's overwhelming support for organ transplantation,"
there is a severe shortage of available organs. As of December 31, 1994, there
5. Peter S. Janzen, Comment, Law at the Edge of Life: Issues of Death and Dying, 7 HAMLINE
L. REV. 431 app. at 457 (1984).
6. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 414 (1980 & Supp. 1994). This definition
excludes those patients who have activity in the brain stem, which controls autonomous body functions
such as respiration. These patients, who lack higher brain activity but have brain stem activity,
experience coma or persistent vegetative state ("PVS"). Some commentators argue that these patients
should be considered legally "dead" since there is virtually no realistic chance of recovery. This
approach would allow PVS patients to become organ donors and would therefore increase the supply
of available organs. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
Other commentators emphasize the need for precise language in this area to avoid confusion. The use
of the term "brain death" may erroneously imply to some that there is more than one kind of death, or
that "brain death" is not in fact "final" death. Although death is a single phenomenon, there are multiple
ways in which it may be determined. Dr. Alexander Capron and Professor Fred Cate suggest that life
should be viewed as a tripod structure of neurological, circulatory, and respiratory activity. When any
one "leg" is destroyed, the structure collapses and the person is dead. See 4 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE
LAW, supra note 4, § 21.01, at 21-13.
7. This was the common law notion of death. See, e.g., 4 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW, supra
note 4, § 21.01, at 21-4 to 21-5.
8. These patients usually die from a head trauma. Typically, they are victims of automobile
accidents or gunshot wounds to the head. The term "brain death" is used to distinguish these cases from
"cardiac death" and does not imply that "brain death" is not "really" death.
9. Aggressive treatment can maintain function of the organs for two to ten days. PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIOR
RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE
DETERMINATION OF DEATH 17 (1981).
10. The process of matching donors and donees raises several practical concerns in itself. See
William E. Braun, Every Kidney Counts, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 883 (1992) (discussing the importance
of matching antigens in the donee and the donated organ); Owen S. Surman, Psychiatric Aspects of
Organ Transplantation, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 972 (1989) (discussing post-operative psychiatric
factors which are significant to transplant recipient selection); New Solution Stretches Organ Transplant
Time, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1989, at C8 (noting the difficulties in matching procedures and organ
preservation, retrieval, and transportation); Transplant Survival Discussed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1987,
at A22 (discussing the importance of tissue-type matching in long-term survival of transplant recipients).
11. A recent poll reported that 85% of Americans support organ donation. THE GALLUP ORGANIZA-
TION, INC., THE PARTNERSHIP FOR ORGAN DONATION, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S ArITUDES TOWARD
ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION 3 (1993). Sixty-nine percent of the survey participants said
that they were "very likely" or "somewhat likely" to request that their own organs be donated. Id. at 4.
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were 37,684 patients awaiting transplants. 2 Of that number, 27,498 (over
two-thirds) were waiting for kidney transplants.' 3 The mean waiting time for
an organ is more than one year, with many patients waiting three to five
years.' 4 Some patients, however, simply cannot wait that long. One report
suggests that each year approximately 60,000 people who could benefit from
a kidney, heart, liver, heart-lung, pancreas, or lung transplant die or are
maintained suboptimally. 5
Meanwhile, the Centers for Disease Control estimates that only fifteen
percent of potential donors actually become donors.' 6 A number of factors
may contribute to the discrepancy between the public's acceptance of organ
donation and the lack of donated organs. Some commentators suggest that the
rate of public approval is actually less than the survey data indicate. 7 Other
commentators blame the manner in which medical professionals approach, or
more often, fail to approach, the subject of organ donation with the families
of potential donors.'" Still others cite physicians' refusal to honor completed
organ donor cards without first consulting the next of kin.' 9
12. UNOS Research Dep't, Patients Waiting for Transplants: Number of Patent Registrations on
the National Waiting List-12/31/94, UNOS UPDATE, Jan. 1995, at 42.
13. Id.
14. Teri Randall, Too Few Human Organs for Transplantation, Too Many in Need... and the Gap
Widens, 265 JAMA 1223, 1223 (1991).
15. Roger W. Evans et al., The Potential Supply of Organ Donors: An Assessment of the Efficiency
of Organ Procurement Efforts in the United States, 267 JAMA 239, 239 (1992).
16. Arthur L. Caplan, Sounding Board: Ethical and Policy Issues in the Procurement of Cadaver
Organs for Transplantation, in HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 272,273 (Dale H. Cowan et al. eds.,
1987).
17. The very fact that the people are participating in a survey may distort the answers they give.
Poll interviewees tend to give socially acceptable, but sometimes insincere, responses. Don Colbum,
Changing the Life-and-Death Rulesfor Transplants, WASH. POST, June 15, 1993, Health Section, at 10.
18. One author noted that an important factor in the decision to donate is the way in which medical
personnel raise the subject with the family of the potential donor. Id. Many doctors are reluctant to raise
the issue of donation. A survey of medical professionals shows that 35% believe that donation requests
place an unfair strain on the family. A.O. Gaber et al., Survey of Attitudes of Health Care Professionals
Toward Organ Donation, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PRoc. 313,314 (1990). Forty-three percent believe that
the solicitation would be offensive to the family. Id. Health care professionals also have little training
in effective approaches to requesting donation. Colbum, supra note 17, at 13. Thus, families tend to
refuse donation requests. Other authors have noted that families are more likely to donate if their
reception by hospital staff is satisfactory, if they have felt involved in the medical decision process, and
if they have had a good rapport with the staff throughout their loved one's hospitalization. Teri Randall
& Charles Marwick, Physicians' Attitudes and Approaches Are Pivotal in Procuring Organs for
Transplantation, 265 JAMA 1227, 1227 (1991); H.A. Werkman et al., Organ Donation from Trauma
Victims, 23 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2553, 2554 (1991).
Another study suggests that separating the message of death from the request for organ donation may
improve procurement rates. Researchers from the University of Kentucky found that 53 of 93 families
(or 57%) agreed to donate their loved one's organs if, before the request was made, they had time to
come to terms with their loved one's death. When the request to donate organs accompanied the
notification of death, only 11 of 62 (or 18%) consented to organ donation. Id. A delay between the
notification of death and the request for organ donation is not only more humane, but also appears to
increase the rate of positive responses.
19. The UAGA states that any individual 18 years of age or older may make an anatomical gift of
his organs upon death. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 2(a), 8 U.L.A. 33 (1987). Twenty-eight percent
of Americans report that they have signed a donor card. THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note
11, at 15. Nonetheless, even when emergency medical personnel find the donor card in time, doctors
are reluctant to remove organs without first obtaining permission from the prospective donor's family
because of fear of malpractice liability. 4 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 4, §21.02[2],
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Whatever the cause, the present system of procuring transplantable organs
from HBCD's cannot supply enough organs to meet the current demand. In
1989, the vast majority of states (73%) and organ procurement organizations
(69%) procured only between ten and twenty donors.2" Clearly, this is not
enough to supply the tens of thousands of organs that are needed. One expert
has calculated that even if the current system were to operate at optimal levels
(reaching 80% of all potential donors), it would supply only 1596 additional
donors per year.2 In terms of the kidney shortage, this would yield only
3192 more kidneys per year, assuming that both kidneys from each donor
could be used. Nearly 24,000 people are on waiting lists for kidneys. Each
month, 1000 more people are added to the list of those waiting,22 while only
800 are removed from the list.23 Thus, even the maximum organ donor pool,
as presently defined, may be insufficient to provide organs to all patients
waiting for them.24
This dilemma has caused many commentators to call for an expansion of the
pool of possible donors.2 ' Among the groups that have been considered as
potential additions to the donor pool are patients in a persistent vegetative
state26 and anencephalic infants.27 Another possibility for creating a larger
pool of potential donors, however, is to utilize organs retrieved from patients
at 21-55. In addition, some state statutes specifically grant family members the right to veto a decedent's
decision to donate. Id. at 21-55 & n.46.
20. Evans et al., supra note 15, at 241.
21. David Anaise, The Non-heartbeating Cadaveric Donor: A Solution to the Organ Shortage
Crisis, UNOS UPDATE, Oct. 1992, at 32, 32 (1992).
22. Randall, supra note 14, at 1223.
23. Of the 800 removed from the list, 600 patients received kidney transplants, and 200 died. Id.
24. Anaise, supra note 2 1, at 32. But see Theodore Cooper, Survey of Development, Current Status,
and Future Prospects for Organ Transplantation, in HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 16,
at 18, 22-23 (arguing that the organ shortage is not caused by a lack of potential donors, since 12,000
to 27,000 automobile accident victims die in hospitals each year).
25. Other commentators believe that the current system could be improved by creating an incentive
to donate. Some researchers believe that the medical community may be able to meet the demand for
organs by accessing more potential donors. Evans et al., supra note 15, at 245. The Mexican
Government has considered a proposal granting all donors "Heroes of the Nation" status, equivalent to
that bestowed on war veterans. The government would then subsidize the donor's burial costs and offer
estate tax abatements. Randall & Marwick, supra note 18, at 1228. This proposal has been advocated
in the United States as well. Glenn Ruffenach, Trying to Cure Shortage of Organ Donors, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 13, 1991, at BI, B3.
Another commentator has concluded that government remuneration for organ donation could generate
a larger supply of donor organs. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1519, 1615, 1627-30 (1990). Other commentators have advocated the creation of a
market for human organs as a solution to the shortage. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman,
The Economics and Ethics of Alternative Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies, 8 YALE J. ON REG.
403 (1991); Susan H. Denise, Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1985).
26. David R. Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 850, 883-84
(1986).
27. Advocates of classifying anencephalic infants as potential donors rely on a beneficence rationale
and the certainty of death for infants born with anencephaly. Jay A. Friedman, Taking the Camel by the
Nose: The Anencephalic as a Source for Pediatric Organ Transplants, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 917 (1990);
Charles N. Rock, Note, The Living Dead: Anencephaly and Organ Donation, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 243 (1989). But see Debra H. Berger, The Infant with Anencephaly: Moral and Legal Dilemmas,
5 IssuEs L. & MED. 67, 80-85 (1989) (arguing against the use of anencephalic infants as organ sources
based on the theory of personhood).
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whose death has been established by an absence of respiratory and circulatory
function (cardiac death). These potential donors, called non-heart-beating
cadaver donors ("NHBCD's"), were the sources of organs for the first human
organ transplants, which took place before the concept of "brain death" was
accepted in the United States.28 Many transplant specialists support the
retrieval of organs from NHBCD's29 and believe that the introduction of a
protocol for using NHBCD organs in hospitals in the United States has the
potential to increase the number of available organs.
II. KIDNEY PERFUSION AND THE SUCCESSFUL USE OF
NON-HEART-BEATING CADAVER DONOR ORGANS
When surgeons were pioneering the technique of human organ transplan-
tation in the 1960's, the organs used necessarily came from cadavers of
patients whose hearts had stopped, because cardiac death was the only
definition of death recognized in the United States at the time. 30 Foremost
among the reasons for the limited success of these early transplants is that
once the heart stops, organs begin to deteriorate. In a short time, the damage
caused by isehemia, the absence of blood circulation in the organ, 3' renders
the organ unsuitable for transplantation.32
Ischemia proved to be a major hurdle for successful transplantation. 33
Medical researchers sought to overcome this obstacle both by searching for
ways to reduce ischemia and by redefining the donor pool. By the early
1970's, scientists had developed methods to preserve organs by means of a
perfusion tube inserted into a cadaver shortly after death. 34 Around the same
time, another group advocated the addition of a neurological component to the
determination of death. The result was the proliferation of "brain death" laws
a few years later.35 By allowing physicians to declare death based on the
absence of brain function, brain death laws' cleared the way for organ
procurement from the bodies of people who had suffered irreversible,
complete brain damage-HBCD's. By using HBCD's as organ donors,
physicians were able to supply organs to all of the potential recipients on
waiting lists at that time. Consequently, further research regarding ways to
limit ischemia, and thus make NHBCD organs usable for transplant, were
28. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
29. Randall, supra note 14, at 1223 (citing Dr. Felix Rapaport, director of the transplantation service
and chair of surgery at the State University of New York at Stony Brook). Some experts resist the use
of NHBCD's for ethical reasons. See, e.g., Stuart J. Youngner & Robert M. Arnold, Ethical,
Psychological, and Public Policy Implications of Procuring Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver
Donors, 269 JAMA 2769, 2770 (1993).
30. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
31. VEBsTER's THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1197 (Phillip B. Gove ed., 3d ed. 1986).
32. Michael A. DeVita et al., History of Organ Donation by Patients with Cardiac Death, 3
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 113, 114 (1993).
33. See Youngner & Arnold, supra note 29, at 2770.
34. Anaise, supra note 21, at 32.
35. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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abandoned.36 Thus, doctors in the United States ceased using cardiac death
patients as organ donors for technical, not ethical, reasons.37 In countries
where the concept of brain death has never been legally recognized, NHBCD's
have continued to be the sole source of donated organs.3 8 Physicians in other
countries retrieve organs from both HBCD's and NHBCD s.
39
Two transplant programs in the United States, one at the Regional Organ
Bank of Illinois ("ROBI") and another at the University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center, have begun to use organs from NHBCD's. 4' These programs use the
perfusion process, as described by a pioneer in the field, Dr. David Anaise:
The clinical situation envisioned is of a trauma victim who succumbs in the
emergency room shortly after arrival. All resuscitative measures are
attempted but fail. After formal declaration of death by the emergency
room physician, a team not involved in the resuscitative process will be
called. An organ procurement tube will be inserted into the femoral artery
of the deceased, and rapid high flush pressure [in place] cooling of UW
solution will be instituted. Simultaneously, two peritoneal dialysis catheters
will be inserted percutaneously. Continuous hypothermic peritoneal
perfusion will further reduce and maintain the core temperature of the
organs for five hours after death. After locating the next of kin, organ
donation will be offered. If refused, the embalmed non-mutilated body will
be released to the family.4
Many medical centers in Japan and Europe currently use this technique.42
Several features of the process Dr. Anaise describes merit emphasis. First,
the insertion of the tube requires only two small incisions in the abdomen.43
Second, these incisions are made, and perfusion begun, only after a declara-
tion of death has been confirmed. The protocol of organ procurement centers
and the laws of many states mandate that the physicians involved in the care
of the decedent and in the declaration of death must not be involved in any
way with organ procurement efforts.44 Thus, the insertion of the perfusion
tube could not legally be performed by those physicians involved in the
resuscitation efforts or in the declaration of death. The procedure to insert the
tube would also be delayed for at least two minutes after the attending
36. Anaise, supra note 21, at 32.
37. Colbum, supra note 17, at 12.
38. Youngner & Arnold, supra note 29, at 2769-70. In Japan, physicians report that it is difficult
to procure organs from HBCD's because the concept of brain death has become unacceptable. M.
Kozaki et al., Procurement of Kidney Grafts from Non-Heart-Beating Donors, 23 TRANSPLANTATION
PROC. 2575, 2577 (1991).
39. Youngner & Arnold, supra note 29, at 2770.
40. The Washington Hospital Center has also recently begun designing a protocol for using
perfusion to preserve organs from NHBCD's. The current proposal, however, extends only to those
patients with donor cards in their possession or who have next of kin present. A consensus conference
felt that it was unwise and possibly illegal to perfuse bodies of patients who do not have donor cards
in their possession when no next of kin could be immediately located. Medlantic Research Institute,
Executive Summary and Summary of the Consensus Conference on Fatal Trauma Victims and Organ
Donation 5 (1994) (unpublished report, on file with the Indiana Law JournaO.
41. Anaise, supra note 21, at 32.
42. See, e.g., Kozaki et al., supra note 38, at 2578.
43. Anaise, supra note 21, at 32.
44. See Colburn, supra note 17, at 13.
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physician declared the patient dead. This delay would allow for the possibility
of auto-resuscitation and would provide a check against a premature
declaration of death. 45 Finally, no organs would be removed without first
obtaining consent from the decedent's next of kin.46 Presently, only the
kidneys can be preserved by perfusion. Nonetheless, because the great
majority of potential organ recipients are waiting for kidneys, perfusion could
significantly reduce the current shortage of those organs.
Perfusion also conforms to the two tenets of organ procurement. First, the
"dead donor rule" commands that organs must be taken only from patients
who are irreversibly dead.47 The technique meets this requirement because
independent medical personnel must make the declaration of death and must
observe the two-minute-waiting period before beginning the procedure. Thus,
the irreversibility of death is established before procurement measures are
initiated.
The second tenet, that the care of living patients who are potential donors
must never be compromised in favor of potential organ recipients,48 is
satisfied by strict protocol rules requiring the separation of organ procurement
teams and care teams. 49 This separation insures that there will be no conflict
of interest on the part of those responsible for the care of dying patients.
45. Auto-resuscitation is the spontaneous start-up of the heart after previous nonfunction. Although
studies of the subject are scarce, experts believe that auto-resuscitation will occur, if at all, within 12-15
seconds of cessation. Thus, the two-minute wait prescribed by the University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center Policy for the Management of Terminally II Patients Who May Become Organ Donors After
Death ("Pittsburgh Protocol") would appear to eliminate the possibility that auto-resuscitation will occur.
See Michael A. DeVita & James V. Snyder, Development of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
Policy for the Care of Terminally Ill Patients Who May Become Organ Donors After Death Following
the Removal of Life Support, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 131, 139 (1993). But see Joanne Lynn, Are
the Patients Whto Become Organ Donors Under the Pittsburgh Protocol for "Non-Heart-Beating
Donors" Really Dead? 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 167, 170-72 (1993) (asserting that insufficient data
has been collected and analyzed to determine whether the two-minute period is adequate to reasonably
rule out the possibility of auto-resuscitation).
46. Anaise, supra note 21, at 32; cf. Daniel J. Crothers & Catherine G. Uglem, A Proposal for a
Presumed Consent Organ Donation Policy in North Dakota, 68 N.D. L. REv. 637 (1992) (advocating
a system that does not require actual consent prior to organ removal).
There is a proposal at the Pittsburgh Medical Center to remove organs from terminally ill patients
who request to be removed from life support systems and become donors. This is a different scenario
than that considered in this Note, and one which raises a whole spectrum of other ethical concerns. In
cases which involve competent, conscious patients, it is conceivable that the doctor would not need to
seek the consent of the next of kin. Pittsburgh Protocol, reprinted in 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. app.
at A-I (1993).
47. Youngner & Arnold, supra note 29, at 2771. The issue of defining "irreversible" both here and
in the Uniform Determination of Death Act is hotly debated and involves medical and philosophical
questions that law cannot answer. See David Cole, Statutory Definitions of Death and the Management
of Terminally Ill Patients Who May Become Organ Donors After Death, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
145 (1993); Tom Tomlinson, The Irreversibility of Death: Reply to Cole, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
157 (1993).
48. Youngner & Arnold, supra note 29, at 2771.
49. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Policy and Procedure Manual (1992), reprinted in 3
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. app. at A-4 to A-5 (1993).
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Although NHBCD kidneys have a greater incidence of delayed function,"°
studies indicate that the long-term success rates of NHBCD kidney transplants
are nearly as high as those of HBCD kidney transplants." In addition, the
greater number of transplants that could be performed by routinely retrieving
organs from NHBCD's would lessen the consequences of nonfunction-
another kidney would be available for a second transplant should the first
transplant prove unsuccessful.5 2 One researcher has concluded that NHBCD's
are a good alternative for maintaining an active transplant program.
53
Researchers estimate that widespread adoption of kidney perfusion could
provide an additional 20,000 to 30,000 kidneys each year. 4
Administrators of a transplant program in the Netherlands which utilizes
kidney perfusion report that using NHBCD kidneys increased procurement
rates by twenty percent, from thirty-two to forty-one kidneys per million
inhabitants.5 ' This report also estimates that a rate of sixty kidneys per
million is possible. 6 Such dramatic increases illustrate that kidney perfusion
could potentially eliminate the current shortage of transplantable kidneys
which costs thousands of lives each year. Significantly, kidney perfusion
would also benefit thousands of potential donors by preserving their right to
donate organs. This would also make the option to donate available to a
greater number of families as a means to cope more effectively with their
tragedy."
In a preliminary study by ROBI of the acceptability of perfusion, a
perfusion tube was inserted in fourteen deceased patients without first
consulting their families. In eleven of those cases, the families consented to
organ donation and in no case did the family object to the procedure.5
50. See G. Kootstra et al., Twenty Percent More Kidneys Through a Non-Heart Beating Program,
23 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 910, 910 (1991).
51. Castelao et al., supra note 3, at 2585; see also P. Rigotti et al., Non-Heart-Beating Donors: An
Alternative Organ Source in Kidney Transplantation, 23 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2579 (1991)
(discussing the feasibility of transplanting kidneys after a long period of ischemia); Werkman et al.,
supra note 18, at 2554 (concluding that in the long term, the results of kidney transplants from
NHBCD's are not different from those achieved by HBCD's); Gordon J. Kinzler, Retrieval of Kidneys
from Non-Heart-Beating Human Cadavers Using In-Situ Perfusion and Iced Saline Peritoneal Lavage
(1994) (unpublished study, on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (finding that in-situ perfusion can
result in functional success of transplanted NHBCD kidneys).
52. Rigotti et al., supra note 51, at 2580.
53. Castelao et al., supra note 3, at 2585-86.
54. Randall, supra note 14, at 1227.
55. G. Kootstra et al., supra note 50, at 911.
56. Id.
57. Studies show that many families found organ donation to actually aid in the grieving process.
In an unpublished survey by the Nashville Regional Procurement Agency, 66% of the families who
responded reported that organ donation was a source of comfort in their time of grief. Eighty-seven
percent responded that they would donate organs again if they were given the choice. Luke Skelley,
Practical Issues in Obtaining Organs for Transplantation, in HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra
note 16, at 261, 264.
58. Colbum, supra note 17, at 12.
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III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF KIDNEY
PERFUSION ON NEWLY DEAD BODIES
Current law relating to kidney perfusion suggests the possibility of
criminal59 or civil actions against the parties who are responsible for
performing the procedure without consent. A civil action could be brought
only by the decedent's next of kin.6" Cases involving unauthorized perfusion,
however, would be ones of first impression.
A. The Relevance of Consent
Despite the fact that the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA") assigns
the primary right to donate organs to the decedent, physicians still normally
seek the consent of the next of kin before beginning any procedure relating
to organ retrieval.6 Although this conservative approach appears to be
legally unnecessary and often impedes the retrieval of organs, there are
several justifications offered for this practice. First, there is a vague common-
law notion of a property interest held by the next of kin in the dead body
which medical personnel try to accommodate.62 The medical community also
has seemingly unfounded fears of liability to the family for relying on the
decedent's wishes alone. 63 Finally, many physicians take every precaution
59. The Model Penal Code provides: "Except as authorized by law, a person who treats a corpse
in a way that he knows would outrage ordinary family sensibilities commits a misdemeanor." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 250.10 (1980). A physician may not be liable under this law because the mens rea of
"knowledge" is required. Since perfusion is performed to allow time to discuss the option of donation
with the family, it would be unnecessary in cases where the doctor knows that the family objects to
donation. It is valuable only when the doctor does not know the family's position on donation at the
time of the decedent's death.
60. The parties may also be subject to a civil action brought by the decedent's estate under a
constitutional rights theory. There are federal constitutional grounds for a right to privacy that extend
to a legitimate refusal of health care. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261,277 (1991) ("[T]he common-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing
the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (recognizing a constitutional right to privacy). The limits of this right are explored in
Kenneth F. Schaffner, Philosophical, Ethical, and Legal Aspects of Resuscitation Medicine. 1I.
Recognizing the Tragic Choice: Food, Water, and the Right to Assisted Suicide, 16 CRIT. CARE MED.
1063 (1988).
A claim by the decedent's estate could assert that the physician had violated the decedent's right to
self-determination and privacy, which includes the right to bodily integrity, by performing the perfusion
procedure without the decedent's consent. Since the procedure is performed after death, however, such
a claim assumes that a dead person has rights that may be violated. Courts that have considered the
issue have rejected this idea, finding that personal rights end with the person's death. Guyton v. Phillips,
606 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1979); Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1979). Actions after death
cannot violate the decedent's rights and are not actionable by the decedent's estate. Guylon, 606 F.2d
at 250-51. Since allowing a decedent's estate to sue a physician for administering a perfusion tube to
a newly deceased person would necessitate granting rights to the dead, it is highly unlikely that
perfusion would support a cause of action by the decedent's estate.
61. Fred H. Cate, Increasing the Supply of Organs for Transplantation: The Role of Ethics and
Law, THiE MEDICAL STAFF COUNSELOR, Fall 1990, at 35, 36.
62. See discussion infra part III.B.I.
63. In a survey of medical personnel, 31% reported that they were concerned that merely requesting
organ donation from the family could expose the hospital to litigation. Gaber et al., supra note 18, at
314.
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to maintain the goodwill of the public in organ transplant efforts because the
current altruistic supply system relies completely on the public's perception
that organ transplant programs should be supported. Thus, experts stress the
need to act conservatively in order to earn and maintain the public's trust.'
If consent is obtained before perfusion is begun, there is no issue about the
legality of the procedure. Unfortunately, this is precisely when perfusion is
unnecessary. When the family can be contacted and consulted immediately
upon the decedent's death, organ procurement can be instituted before
ischemia begins.
The more interesting question is whether perfusion should be allowed absent
the consent of the next of kin. This is a different issue than organ removal
without consent because perfusion does not involve the removal of any organ
and can be utilized to involve families more fully in the organ donation
decision. Instead, perfusion leaves the body intact and is an aid to preserving
a family's opportunity to donate-a way to accommodate both the interests
of those needing organs and those who may consent to donating organs.
Before perfusion can gain widespread acceptance, however, physicians must
be confident that they do not risk incurring legal liability for performing the
procedure. Under the current legal framework, a decedent's next of kin might
present a variety of claims for unauthorized perfusion.
B. The Possible Claims of the Decedent's Next of Kin Against
Parties Performing Perfusion Without Consent
The decedent's next of kin could assert three possible claims as the basis
for civil liability against the physician responsible for inserting the perfusion
tube prior to obtaining consent. First, she may claim that the procedure
interfered with her right to possess the body. A tort action to recover damages
under this theory would rely on a traditional property-type interest in the
cadaver vesting in the decedent's next of kin.6 5 The decedent's family might
also bring a tort suit for the infliction of emotional distress. 66 Finally, the
next of kin might claim that perfusion violated her religious beliefs. Provided
that the doctor's or hospital's involvement constituted "state action," she
could bring a civil action based on the violation of his constitutional right of
freedom to exercise his religion.67
64. Youngner & Arnold, supra note 29, at 2773.
65. See infra part III.B.1.
66. See infra part III.B.2.
67. See infra part II.B.3.
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1. The Next of Kin's Quasi-Property Right in a Corpse:
A Judicial Barrier to Modern Organ Transplantation
At common law, the was no property right in the body of a deceased
person.6" Some courts have, however, recognized a quasi-property right in
dead bodies in the next of kin,69 which arises out of that person's duty to
bury the decedent.70 Although considered to be a right to the possession of
the remains in the same condition as they were at the moment of the
decedent's death, 7' this quasi-property right concept has been widely
criticized.72 Unlike other property rights, the "property" right in a cadaver
cannot be bought, sold, or traded.7 3 In fact, the quasi-property holder is not
entitled to do anything with the cadaver other than dispose of it according to
the public health laws of the state.7 4 The UAGA, adopted in some form by
every state, and other statutes governing the disposition of dead bodies have
unwittingly strengthened this notion of a property interest in cadavers by
allowing bodies to be donated upon death, thus treating bodies like other
property subject to devise upon death.7"
Characterizing this obligation of the next of kin to bury the dead as a
quasi-property right has caused great confusion and has proved to be an
impediment to organ procurement efforts.76 Some courts have confronted this
conflict directly when addressing challenges to laws that allowed the
nonconsensual removal of corneas from cadavers during autopsies. For
example, in Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant,7 the mother of the
decedent sued a hospital and an eye bank for the removal of the corneas from
her deceased child pursuant to a statute authorizing removal absent objection
by the next of kin. The plaintiff based her suit on the theory that the law
violated her due process rights by depriving her of property without notice or
opportunity to object. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied her claim, stating
that there was no constitutionally protected property right in a dead body.
Rather, the court characterized the right as merely a recognition of the
68. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 2 (1988).
69. See, e.g., Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1983); McCoy v. Georgia Baptist Hosp.,
306 S.E.2d 746, 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 507 A.2d 718,
725 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); see also 22A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 68, § 3, at 10 n.22 (citing
other useful authority).
70. 22A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 69, § 3.
71. Id.
72. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §12, at 63 (5th ed.
1984).
73. Id.
74. 22A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 68, § 5.
75. Ironically, the UAGA was enacted to give the decedent autonomy regarding anatomical gifts
upon death. By creating a system that treats organs like other forms of property, the UAGA may have
created additional support for those who would argue that the ownership of this "property" devolves
upon the decedent's next of kin upon death-because the dead cannot literally own property. See 4
TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW, supra note 4, § 21.01[2].
76. Id.
77. 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985).
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interests of the survivor's possession and control of a cadaver.7" The court
added that laws may be changed by the legislature unless prevented by consti-
tutional limitations.79 Consequently, the legislature could constitutionally
limit the legal interests in cadavers. Finally, recognizing the substantial
benefits to transplant recipients, the court relied on the traditional govern-
mental function of promoting the public health to conclude that laws
authorizing removal of corneas absent objection are within the authority of the
legislature."0
The Supreme Court of Florida confronted the same issue in State v.
Powell,"' where the petitioner challenged a similar law authorizing cornea
removal by medical examiners without first consulting the next of kin. In
Powell, the next of kin advanced two arguments. First, they argued that the
law constituted an impermissible taking of private property. 2 The court
examined at length the "property right" of the next of kin in a dead body and
rejected the argument, concluding that cadavers are not constitutionally
protected private property.83
The next of kin also argued that the actions of the medical examiner
deprived them of the fundamental liberty right to dispose of the decedent's
remains.8 4 In rejecting this argument, the court declined to apply strict
scrutiny analysis, stating, "We find that the right of the next of kin to a tort
claim for interference with burial ... does not rise to the constitutional
dimension of a fundamental right traditionally protected under either the
United States or Florida Constitution." 5 Instead, the court relied on rational
basis review and upheld the law, finding that it was rationally related to the
legitimate purpose of restoring sight to the blind.
6
At least one other state court has also ruled on this issue. In Tillman v.
Detroit Receiving Hospital,7 a Michigan court upheld a similar law following
the same analysis. The court noted that only fundamental rights are guaranteed
by the constitutional right of privacy. It found that any interest of the next of
kin in a dead body is not fundamental, and thus, there is no constitutional
conflict with a law allowing cornea removal without the consent of the
family.8
8
These cases illustrate a judicial trend to strictly limit the "quasi-property"
right of the next of kin to the duty to bury. They also indicate a judicial
inclination to support governmental efforts to advance organ transplantation
78. Id. at 128.
79. Id. at 128-29.
80. Id. at 129.
81. 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986).
82. Id. Although the next of kin's argument was based on the Florida Constitution, the same
argument could be brought based on the Federal Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
83. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1189.
84. Id. at 1193.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1191.
87. 360 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
88. Id. at 277-78.
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as a legitimate state goal. All of these cases concerning the removal of
corneas involved: (1) actions specifically authorized by statute, and (2) a
relevant state interest in restoring sight to the blind. At least one court,
however, has been faced with a similar "property" claim where the defendant
was clearly guilty of wrongdoing. In Arnaud v. Odom, 9 the plaintiff parents
asserted a claim for deprivation of property without due process against a
coroner who performed an unauthorized experiment on the decedent's body.
Although the court suggested the availability of another type of tort claim to
the plaintiffs for the defendant's actions, it stated:
tW]e decline to create from the substantive parameters of the due process
clause a liberty interest in the next of kin to be free from state-occasioned
mutilation of the body of a deceased relative and to possess the body for
burial in the same condition in which death left the body.9"
This court's holding was an even stronger statement than those of the other
courts. In this case, not only were the coroner's actions not authorized by
statute, but no state interest was served. By denying constitutional status to
the rights in dead bodies even in light of the coroner's wrongful mutilation
of the body, the court implicitly acknowledged that such protection, though
equitable here, would be disastrous in other contexts.
The Sixth Circuit, however, has recognized a property claim to a dead body.
Using an analysis similar to that suggested by petitioners in other due process
cases, the court found that such a claim is entitled to the protection of the
Due Process Clause and thus invalidated an Ohio provision which was
analogous to the Georgia, Florida, and Michigan laws upheld by other courts.
In Brotherton v. Cleveland,9 the court acknowledged the difficulty in calling
the claim of the next of kin "property," but maintained that the next of kin
had a "legitimate claim of entitlement" which rises to the level of constitu-
tional protection.92
With such a distinct difference in treatment among jurisdictions, this area
of the law is long overdue for reconsideration. The vague notion of interests
in cadavers was developed at common law to create a cause of action in the
next of kin against grave robbers.93 Because grave robbing is no longer the
concern that it once was, legal interests in cadavers are unnecessary relics
from an earlier time. In contrast with the pre-transplantation era during which
the quasi-property concept evolved, today, cadaver organs hold great value to
society as a means of saving lives. This new use for organs is poorly served
by the old legal framework. The elusive property interest has been limited by
89. 870 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1989).
90. Id, at 305.
91. 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
92. Id. at 482.
93. Under the common law, since cadavers were not property, no action would lie against anyone
disturbing or stealing them. This loophole allowed some to make a business of procuring cadavers for
anatomy schools. This "quasi-property" concept evolved to allow the next of kin to sue for the return
of the body. For an excellent historical discussion of the evolution of property rights in dead bodies, see
Paul Matthews, Whose Body? People as Property, 36 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 191 (1983).
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many courts, but stubbornly maintained by others. Furthermore, most
jurisdictions have yet to consider the issue. With such uncertain legal
precedent, it is understandable that medical personnel are fearful of the legal
consequences of taking any action to procure organs without the consent of
the next of kin.94
Perfusion fares favorably under a balancing analysis. On one side of the
balance is the interest of the next of kin in controlling the disposition of the
dead body. This interest is not fundamental and thus can be legislatively
circumscribed, as has been done in many states in the context of cornea
removal." Compared to cornea removal, perfusion presents a lesser intrusion
on the quasi-property right of the next of kin in the cadaver because nothing
is taken from the body. Instead, perfusion leaves the body wholly intact
except for the incisions into which the perfusion tube is placed. Because
nothing is taken without due process, the pure takings argument advanced in
Powell would be inapplicable to perfusion. The abdominal incisions required
for perfusion are small and undetectable on a clothed corpse. Furthermore, if
the family objected to organ donation, a physician could remove the tube and
close the incision with no effect on the decedent's body. Thus, the next of
kin's right would be substantially preserved.
On the other side of the balance is the important benefit to society from
saving the lives of those who need kidney transplants. Governmental measures
in support of perfusion would qualify as actions to promote the public health,
a factor that both the Florida and Georgia courts considered.96 It is doubtful
that a majority of the courts which have ruled on the property claims of next
of kin would object to perfusion because these courts have declined to classify
this claim of a property right as fundamental. Accordingly, most courts have
reviewed the statutes at issue using only a rational basis standard and
ultimately have upheld them. Even the Sixth Circuit's analysis, which
recognized a "legitimate claim of entitlement,"97 would not necessarily
prohibit perfusion without consent. The court's analysis required only
predeprivation process.9" Consequently, a court could adequately distinguish
perfusion as not involving deprivation of a property right (because nothing is
taken), and thereby avoid triggering the process requirement. It is probable,
however, that a court would characterize the right implicated as the right to
possess the body in its condition at death. Strictly speaking, perfusion does
operate to deprive the next of kin of this "right." Therefore, a law allowing
the technique would be unconstitutional under this analysis.
94. See supra notes 18, 63, and accompanying text.
95. See Daphne D. Sipes, Does It Matter Whether There is Public Policy or Presumed Consent in
Organ Transplantation?, 12 WHIrrIER L. REv. 505, 525 (1991). Thirteen states have statutes that
operate as "presumed consent" statutes. Unless there is evidence to the contrary, these statutes presume
that the deceased wished to become an organ donor.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 77-86.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
98. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991).
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Because the position of most courts is generally unclear and physicians are
unsure of the liability they might incur, perfusion will continue to be sidelined
until a definitive change is made and courts discontinue their use of the
unfortunate term "quasi-property." This right merely consists of a duty to
bury, not a property interest.
2. Tort Claims for Emotional Distress
The next of kin could also bring a tort claim against a physician for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, or outrage (depending upon which cause of action is recognized
under the relevant state law) for perfusing a decedent's body without first
obtaining consent.99 The theory of such a claim would be that the defen-
dant's conduct in perfusing the cadaver caused additional suffering beyond
that caused by the death of the decedent. The Restatement of Torts ("Restate-
ment") identifies a claim specifically for interference with dead bodies. It
states: "One who intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, withholds,
mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person or prevents its proper
interment or cremation is subject to liability to a member of the family of the
deceased who is entitled to the disposition of the body."' '
A comment to this Restatement section recognizes that the technical basis
for such a claim is the quasi-property right of the next of kin, but notes that
in practice, decedents' families have typically relied on mental distress as
their cause of action.' ' Cases have been brought under this theory of
recovery against undertakers for withholding bodies for payment'0 2 and for
improperly embalming corpses."0 3 Plaintiffs have also brought mental
distress claims against carriers for improper shipping10 4 and against medical
examiners for performing unauthorized autopsies.0 5
Recognizing mental distress claims in these contexts enables plaintiff
families to recover damages absent any physical injury. For this reason, some
99. See, e.g., Rauhe v. Langeland Memorial Chapel, 186 N.W.2d 848 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Dale
v. Thomas Funeral Home, 466 N.W.2d 805 (Neb. 1991); Clark v. Smith, 494 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1973).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1977).
101. Id. cmt. a.
102. See, e.g., Dale, 466 N.W.2d 805.
103. See, e.g., Clark, 494 S.W.2d 192.
104. See, e.g., Rauhe, 186 N.W.2d 868.
105. See, e.g., Division of Labor Enforcement, Dep't of Indus. Relations v. Gifford, 290 P.2d 281
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955). The traditional view of liability for unauthorized autopsies is that the person
responsible is liable even if the body is not mutilated and can be properly buried, since the primary
consideration for the rule is the emotional effect on the next of kin. But there is also authority for the
view that damages cannot be recovered based only on the fact that an autopsy was performed unless
the body was mutilated or changed in some way. See 22A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 68, § 4. Since
perfusion is a non-mutilating procedure, the latter group of authorities would probably decline to award
damages for perfusion without consent. This point is moot, however, if the Restatement is adopted, since
it also establishes liability for operating on dead bodies and does not predicate liability solely on
mutilation.
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courts have rejected such claims. 0 6 For example, some courts limit the
application of this cause of action by also requiring that the act be at least
intentional, that is, done with the purpose or knowledge of the likelihood of
causing the injury, in order for a plaintiff to claim damages for emotional
distress.1
0 7
Some courts also require that the plaintiff show more than simple negli-
gence to recover damages.'0 8 These courts have articulated a difficult
standard for plaintiffs to meet; one court stated that the plaintiff must show
that the defendant's conduct was "'so outrageous in character and so extreme
in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and is to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."""
Such proof obviously exceeds the requirements of simple negligence and
would thus limit the number of potential plaintiffs.
In jurisdictions where courts utilize this standard, a physician is not likely
to be held liable for perfusing a cadaver without consent. Taking action to
preserve the possibility of using the organs from a cadaver to save the lives
of organ recipients is hardly the type of action at which the rule is aimed. The
level of culpability required by these courts would insulate physicians from
liability for this type of claim. On the other hand, jurisdictions adopting the
Restatement approach, which requires a showing of simple negligence, might
hold a physician liable for perfusing cadavers. Moreover, the issue of
negligence would be an individualized determination that could lead to
liability for perfusion in some cases but not in others. Accordingly, under the
current legal framework, the medical community could not be broadly
reassured that they will not face liability for tort claims for routinely
perfusing dead bodies. This lack of certainty will prevent physicians from
adopting perfusion to a meaningful degree.
Furthermore, because the law differs among jurisdictions, physicians in
some states might be able to utilize the technique while their colleagues in
other states would be liable for tort damages for performing the same
procedure. While this is true of all acts governed by state tort law, this
differential treatment is particularly harmful when it operates to suppress new,
life-saving technology and prevents the adoption of a standardized medical
practice. The existing framework might be made somewhat more amenable to
the widespread adoption of perfusion if all courts were to require that
plaintiffs show at least an intent to harm in order to recover for emotional
distress damages from physicians. Such a universal position in all jurisdictions
is unlikely, however.
106. 1 DAMAGES IN TORT AcTIONS § 7-31 (Marilyn Minzer et al. eds., 1993).
107. E.g., Naughgle v. Feeney-Hornak Shadeland Mortuary, 498 N.E.2d 1298 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
108. E.g., Nichols v. Busse, 503 N.W.2d 173, 179 (Neb. 1993) (requiring a showing of "intentional
or reckless" conduct).
109. Id. (quoting Gall v. Great Western Sugar Co., 363 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Neb. 1985)).
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3. A Free Exercise Claim Against Parties
Responsible for Perfusion
A third claim that might be asserted by the decedent's next of kin is that
perfusing the cadaver violated her constitutional right to freely exercise her
religion."0 Assuming that the state is implicated, a court would evaluate a
free exercise claim by weighing the state's asserted interest against the
individual's claim."' To justify the impingement of an individual's exercise
of religion, the state's interest must be substantial. Here, the state could assert
an interest in (1) increasing the supply of transplantable organs and thereby
promoting the public health, and (2) preserving the rights of the decedent or
the family to make an organ donation." 2 In response, the next of kin would
then likely assert that her religion required that the body of the decedent not
be changed from its condition at death. Because perfusion does not involve
the removal of any organs, this argument would require more than an
objection to organ removal." 3 The argument would require an absolute
religious prohibition against any incision or change in the condition of a dead
body." 4 A court would then presumably weigh alternative methods of
accomplishing the same state objective. Other methods that have been
suggested to increase the supply of available organs include creating a market
I10. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. An obvious threshold problem to a free exercise claim against
perfusion currently is that there is no law authorizing or mandating the perfusion of cadavers without
consent, thus there appears to be a lack of state action. The Constitution guarantees the freedom only
from governmental intrusion into the exercise of one's religion, so as an initial matter, a court would
have to construe perfusion without consent as an action of the government But the adoption of a law
authorizing the procedure would clearly constitute state action. Furthermore, performing perfusion at a
government-operated facility would very likely constitute state action even without a law specifically
authorizing the procedure.
11. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
112. See supra note 1.
113. Most of the major religious denominations in the United States allow or encourage the donation
of organs. Sipes, supra note 95, at 507 (citing TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, OFFICE OF
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUEs AND RECOMMENDATIONS (final report,
Apr. 1986)); see also R.P. Bulka, Jewish Perspective on Organ Transplantation, 22 TRANSPLANTATION
PROC. 945 (1990) (concluding that Jewish philosophy encourages organ donation); Peter J. Kalshoven,
A Humanistic Concept of the Human Body After Death, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 950 (1990)
(concluding that organ donation is "a truly humanistic gesture"); Emiko Namihira, Shinto Concept
Concerning the Dead Human Body, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 940 (1990) (arguing that Shinto beliefs
are not inconsistent with organ donation); Ahmad F. Sahin, Islamic Transplantation Ethics, 22
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 939 (1990) (concluding that nothing in Islamic ethics would forbid
transplantation); Suzanne Scorsone, Christianity and the Significance of the Human Body, 22
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 943 (1990) (noting that donation is actually encouraged by Christian
principles); S.H.J. Sugunasiri, The Buddhist View Concerning the Dead Body, 22 TRANSPLANTATION
PROC. 947 (1990)(concluding that Buddhism does not prohibit organ transplantation); H.L. Trivedi,
Hindu Religious View in Context of Transplantation of Organs from Cadavers, 22 TRANSPLANTATION
PROC. 942 (1990) (concluding that Hindu tenets encourage organ donation).
114. One must keep in mind that the decedent's next of kin would have to assert that a third party's
actions on another party (and a dead one at that) violated her religious beliefs. Her own body was not
harmed. She must assert the claim that her belief is in maintaining the integrity of the bodies of all
relatives. It is questionable whether the Free Exercise Clause is implicated when the claim is that
someone else is violating the claimant's rights, but that the claimant herself is not in any way coerced
into violating her religious principles. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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for organs, 1 5  conscripting organs,116  and presuming consent to
donation ' 7 (the type of procurement system at issue in the Georgia Lions,
Powell, Tillman, and Brotherton cases)." 8 Allowing perfusion would surely
be a less objectionable method of obtaining kidneys than would these other
proposals, each of which involves either the sale of human organs. 9 or
ignoring the family's wishes to some degree.
A law allowing perfusion would be analogous to other doctrines in the field
of medical care law which, in certain circumstances, effectively allow
physicians to perform medical procedures that may violate the religious
beliefs of the patient. 20 For example, the emergency doctrine allows
medical personnel to provide emergency treatment without ascertaining the
wishes of the patient.2 ' Because of the time constraints in emergency care,
obtaining consent is not always possible. The law simply presumes that
everyone wants emergency care that might preserve their life.' 22 Similarly,
perfusion is emergency care that preserves organs, statutory rights, and the
lives of others. The time constraint is similar. Thus, the policy that supports
the emergency doctrine would also stpport a similar protection for physicians
who, under a time-pressured clinical situation, decide to perfuse a body but
later discover that the family objects to the treatment on religious grounds.
This extension has, of course, not yet been made and the legal viability of
such claims has not yet been tested. Thus, as the law currently exists,
physicians face potential liability under a free exercise claim as well.
IV. A MODEL LAW TO PROMOTE THE USE OF PERFUSION
TO SALVAGE TRANSPLANTABLE KIDNEYS
With the variety of claims that could be asserted by the next of kin against
a physician perfusing a dead body without consent and the substantial legal
ambiguity of the issue, physicians are justifiably cautious about the wide-
spread use of perfusion to salvage kidneys. This apprehension will prevent
perfusion from being utilized to any significant degree.
115. See, e.g., Blair & Kaserman, supra note 25.
116. Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft
Act, 68 B.U. L. REv. 681 (1988).
117. Crothers & Uglem, supra note 46.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 72-92.
119. See generally Denise, supra note 25 (discussing the arguments against human organ markets).
120. Other medical procedures which might violate the beliefs of individuals and families, such as
intubation, are often performed surreptitiously on newly deceased bodies without first obtaining consent
from the next of kin. An analogy could be drawn between intubation and perfusion. Although some
argue that the practice is justified by the great need of young physicians to learn the procedure, the
minimal risk to the dead body, and the substantial social benefits, others say that this practice is
unethical and physicians should try more diligently to obtain consent from the next of kin before the
body is used for any purpose. James P. Orlowski et al., The Ethics of Using Newly Dead Patients for
Teaching and Practicing Intubation Techniques, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 439 (1988). Perfusion also risks
little harm to the dead body and could bring great benefits to society.
121. See Miller v. Rhode Island Hosp., 625 A.2d 778, 784 & n.5 (RI. 1993) (explaining the
emergency exception to the informed consent doctrine).
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D cmt. a (1977).
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The issue, like so many in the law, distills to a process of balancing. On
one side are the interests of a few families who might object to being unable
to bury their dead in precisely the same condition as when they died. On the
other side are the thousands of people whose lives could be saved or
improved if only there were enough kidneys available for them. It is also
necessary to consider the interests of those who strongly wish to become
organ donors but will be denied this right according to current medical
practice.
Perfusion can enable thousands of people to donate organs who were
unable, until now, to do so. It will also allow more time for medical personnel
to approach families about organ donation. This more sensitive approach, in
turn, will increase the positive response rate and thus, the supply of
transplantable kidneys. If, after perfusion is begun, the family opposes
donation, the procedure is completely reversible-the tube is simply removed
and the incision sutured. The family has not suffered any significant detriment
to their "property" interests, their emotional well-being, or their religious
beliefs.
In order to encourage physicians to adopt perfusion as a standard procedure
in those cases of cardiac death in which organ donation is an option, a law
specifically allowing such measures should be adopted. The following is a
proposed model:
A licensed physician not involved in the care of a deceased patient may use
reasonably accepted medical practices to preserve the right to donate
organs upon death until the decedent's wishes can be ascertained (1) provi-
ded no organ or tissue is removed or detached and (2) any care so provided
to maintain the viability of donation is free to the prospective donor.
Each element of this proposed statute will operate to maintain the integrity of
the procedure for which it was adopted.
"A licensed physician not involved in the care of the deceased patient"
would prevent a conflict of interest between providing the best possible care
for those dying and prescribing treatments that will produce the most usable
organs. By prohibiting physicians involved in the care of dying patients from
performing any procedure on the individual to procure organs, the law
requires terminal care physicians to always honor the interests of the dying
patients and to ignore organ procurement issues. These issues, including
perfusion, are properly handled by another physician who must not be
involved until after the patient's death.
"Reasonably accepted medical practices" would enable the law to apply to
other new non- or semi-invasive technologies designed to preserve organs as
these procedures are developed. The specific wording of this phrase will also
allow a physician to determine what the reasonable course of action might be
in a particular case. Mandated perfusion would be unsound because not all
cardiac death patients will be medically fit to become organ donors. In such
cases, a physician should not be required to perfuse the body, but instead
should rely on her reasoned judgment of the utility of perfusion to procure
transplantable organs under the circumstances.
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"To preserve the right to donate organs upon death" would limit the purpose
for which procedures may be performed on a dead body. Any other purpose
is not authorized by this statute. The phrasing of this element also emphasizes
that organ donation is a statutorily created right that must be preserved and
respected.
"Until the decedent's wishes can be ascertained" would prohibit a physician
from continuing perfusion after consent for organ donation has been denied.
Since perfusion is strictly a tool to preserve the opportunity to consent to
donation, it should be discontinued once medical professionals have had
sufficient time to approach the family thoughtfully and humanely about organ
donation and the family still has chosen not to donate. Secondly, this phrasing
mirrors that of the UAGA by authorizing reliance on the wishes of the
decedent, if they are known. Thus, the statute would not require a physician
to obtain consent from the decedent's next of kin if the decedent's wishes
could be ascertained from an organ donor card or by other means. Although
this practice is not embraced in the medical community today, if physicians
begin to rely on organ donor cards alone, they might also do so under the
proposed statute in cases involving cardiac death patients.
"Provided no organ or tissue is removed or detached" would prevent
medical personnel from using any invasive procedure, mutilating the body, or
removing organs without consent. By analytically and legally separating
procedures to preserve organs without consent from procedures to remove
organs without consent, the statute highlights the great difference between
these two cases. It allows even strong opponents of presumed consent systems
of donation to support perfusion, not as a way to undermine or otherwise
overrule the family's decision, but instead as a means to preserve the
opportunity to consent.
"Any care so provided to maintain the viability of donation is free to the
prospective donor" would require transplant services to include the costs of
such care in the price charged to the organ recipient. Clearly, the extra
procedures performed after death are not for the benefit of the deceased and
should not be borne by her estate.
Such a law would clarify the legal landscape regarding organ transplant
efforts and would give physicians the legal protection they will require before
perfusion and similar measures are adopted. Although this law would defeat
a claim by the next of kin on either a property rights or emotional distress
basis, the next of kin could still bring a constitutional challenge based on
interference with religious beliefs because a law authorizing perfusion
constitutes state action. Again, a court hearing such a claim would weigh the
significant benefits of perfusion against the possible religious objection to
perfusing a dead body.
Although a law authorizing perfusion would not completely insulate
physicians from liability, it would significantly decrease the number of
possible bases for legal claims. This law would be a less drastic measure than
conscription of organs or presumed consent and would supply kidneys to
nearly all of those who need them. By utilizing available technology that is
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currently in use outside the United States, more people could become organ
donors and tens of thousands of lives could be saved.
CONCLUSION
There is currently an organ shortage of crisis proportion in the United
States. Kidneys are the organ most in demand. The current system simply
does not supply enough organs to benefit all of those who need them.
Perfusion is a technologically viable method of increasing the supply of
transplantable kidneys by utilizing a group currently overlooked as potential
donors. With the multiplicity of claims that can be brought against physicians
and the confusing differences in legal interpretations among jurisdictions,
however, physicians are not likely to adopt perfusion as a common practice
unless the legal community can provide them with some degree of assurance
that they will not be held liable for doing so.
Why does American society move so slowly to adopt a life-saving
procedure that other countries currently use? Elements in the mix probably
include a superstitious concept of dead bodies and discomfort in general with
issues of death and dying. And, of course, the legal system is designed to
move slowly and cautiously. Some would argue that this caution is most
needed in the face of new, untried technologies with uncertain consequences.
While such caution may be useful in some abstract, formalistic sense, it is
inappropriate when real individuals die each day despite the fact that viable
medical procedures could save them.
Kidney perfusion builds on previously accepted principles such as the
traditional definition of death, the power of the state to define the content of
non-constitutional rights, and the right of the state to, in some circumstances,
assume that the decedent would wish to donate organs.
A law specifically authorizing perfusion would be the most expedient way
to convince liability-wary physicians to make kidney perfusion a routine
procedure in applicable cases. The law would also create a uniform national
standard which would facilitate interstate organ procurement efforts.
In the interim, courts could take steps to limit the applicability of the three
possible claims of a decedent's next of kin. First, a definitive statement that
the next of kin hold no property interest in a cadaver would prevent these
"property-based" claims. Second, emotional distress claims could be limited
to cases where the person operating upon a dead body does so for a malicious
purpose or with reckless disregard of the wishes of the family. Finally, an
exception to liability for violating the next of kin's freedom of religion could
be modeled after the emergency doctrine for kidney perfusion.
Science and medicine sprint forward to the benefit of us all, while the law
drags its heels. Science and medicine make discoveries and find new
information while the law seeks to fit this new information into its old
framework. So as not to stifle medical progress, the law must endeavor to
keep pace with science and be willing to adopt a new framework when the old
one is no longer workable. The law impacting kidney perfusion is just such
a case. A new statute authorizing kidney perfusion would endorse the acts of
physicians that save lives and benefit us all.
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